Preprint

Underestimating Honesty in Distributive Negotiations: Misjudging Counterparts’ Motivations

This article is a preprint and has not been certified by peer review [What does this mean?].

Author(s) / Creator(s)

Garber, Shira
Moran, Simone
Keysar, Boaz
Bereby-Meyer, Yoella

Abstract / Description

Negotiators often face two dilemmas: whether to be honest and whether to believe their counterpart is honest. We propose a discrepancy in how negotiators approach these dilemmas, leading to an expected-versus-actual honesty gap. When deciding whether to be honest, negotiators are influenced not only by self-interest but also by moral-identity concerns, which promote honesty. However, when deciding whether counterparts are honest, negotiators assume they are primarily motivated by self-interest and thus overestimate their dishonesty. Five studies examining online secondhand market negotiations found that buyers often underestimated sellers’ honesty, and that this was accounted for by their misperceptions of sellers’ motivations. While sellers tended to be honest because of moral-identity concerns, buyers expected them to be driven primarily by self-interest. The actual-expected honesty gap was particularly prevalent when sellers’ moral-identity concerns were situationally activated, and altering buyers’ perceptions of sellers’ motivations reduced the gap. Findings further suggest potential targeted interventions to foster trust.

Keyword(s)

honesty negotiation social judgment deception guilt

Persistent Identifier

Date of first publication

2026-06-16

Publisher

PsychArchives

Citation

  • Author(s) / Creator(s)
    Garber, Shira
  • Author(s) / Creator(s)
    Moran, Simone
  • Author(s) / Creator(s)
    Keysar, Boaz
  • Author(s) / Creator(s)
    Bereby-Meyer, Yoella
  • PsychArchives acquisition timestamp
    2026-06-16T11:01:24Z
  • Made available on
    2026-06-16T11:01:24Z
  • Date of first publication
    2026-06-16
  • Abstract / Description
    Negotiators often face two dilemmas: whether to be honest and whether to believe their counterpart is honest. We propose a discrepancy in how negotiators approach these dilemmas, leading to an expected-versus-actual honesty gap. When deciding whether to be honest, negotiators are influenced not only by self-interest but also by moral-identity concerns, which promote honesty. However, when deciding whether counterparts are honest, negotiators assume they are primarily motivated by self-interest and thus overestimate their dishonesty. Five studies examining online secondhand market negotiations found that buyers often underestimated sellers’ honesty, and that this was accounted for by their misperceptions of sellers’ motivations. While sellers tended to be honest because of moral-identity concerns, buyers expected them to be driven primarily by self-interest. The actual-expected honesty gap was particularly prevalent when sellers’ moral-identity concerns were situationally activated, and altering buyers’ perceptions of sellers’ motivations reduced the gap. Findings further suggest potential targeted interventions to foster trust.
    en
  • Publication status
    other
  • Review status
    notReviewed
  • Persistent Identifier
    https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12034/17567
  • Persistent Identifier
    https://doi.org/10.23668/psycharchives.22208
  • Language of content
    eng
  • Publisher
    PsychArchives
  • Keyword(s)
    honesty
  • Keyword(s)
    negotiation
  • Keyword(s)
    social judgment
  • Keyword(s)
    deception
  • Keyword(s)
    guilt
  • Dewey Decimal Classification number(s)
    150
  • Title
    Underestimating Honesty in Distributive Negotiations: Misjudging Counterparts’ Motivations
    en
  • DRO type
    preprint