Preprint

Disbelieved Beliefs: Subjective Estimates of Bias in Probabilistic Beliefs And Their Relationships to Desire

This article is a preprint and has not been certified by peer review [What does this mean?].

Author(s) / Creator(s)

Baron, Jonathan
Siepmann, Michael
Steinberg, Karen
Sabini, John

Abstract / Description

It has often been argued or assumed that it is impossible to simultaneously have a belief and disbelieve that belief, or view it as biased in a specific direction. In three studies we asked people what they believed were the probabilities of various outcomes varying in desirability, and then asked them what they would believe if they thought (a) in the way they would ideally like themselves and others to think, (b) in a way that would maximize the accuracy of their beliefs, or (c) in a way that would maximize the effectiveness of their beliefs for goal achievement. Results suggest that conscious disbelief of one's beliefs is neither impossible nor uncommon, that it is related to desire (though differently for different people), and that it may reflect some degree of accurate awareness of biasing effects of desire.

Keyword(s)

Desirability bias Motivated bias Self-deception Beliefs Awareness

Persistent Identifier

Date of first publication

2021-12-09

Publisher

PsychArchives

Citation

Baron, J., Siepmann, M., Steinberg, K., & Sabini, J. (2021). Disbelieved Beliefs: Subjective Estimates of Bias in Probabilistic Beliefs And Their Relationships to Desire. PsychArchives. https://doi.org/10.23668/PSYCHARCHIVES.5280
  • Author(s) / Creator(s)
    Baron, Jonathan
  • Author(s) / Creator(s)
    Siepmann, Michael
  • Author(s) / Creator(s)
    Steinberg, Karen
  • Author(s) / Creator(s)
    Sabini, John
  • PsychArchives acquisition timestamp
    2021-12-09T09:19:59Z
  • Made available on
    2021-12-09T09:19:59Z
  • Date of first publication
    2021-12-09
  • Abstract / Description
    It has often been argued or assumed that it is impossible to simultaneously have a belief and disbelieve that belief, or view it as biased in a specific direction. In three studies we asked people what they believed were the probabilities of various outcomes varying in desirability, and then asked them what they would believe if they thought (a) in the way they would ideally like themselves and others to think, (b) in a way that would maximize the accuracy of their beliefs, or (c) in a way that would maximize the effectiveness of their beliefs for goal achievement. Results suggest that conscious disbelief of one's beliefs is neither impossible nor uncommon, that it is related to desire (though differently for different people), and that it may reflect some degree of accurate awareness of biasing effects of desire.
    en
  • Publication status
    other
  • Review status
    notReviewed
  • Citation
    Baron, J., Siepmann, M., Steinberg, K., & Sabini, J. (2021). Disbelieved Beliefs: Subjective Estimates of Bias in Probabilistic Beliefs And Their Relationships to Desire. PsychArchives. https://doi.org/10.23668/PSYCHARCHIVES.5280
    en
  • Persistent Identifier
    https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12034/4690
  • Persistent Identifier
    https://doi.org/10.23668/psycharchives.5280
  • Language of content
    eng
  • Publisher
    PsychArchives
  • Keyword(s)
    Desirability bias
    en
  • Keyword(s)
    Motivated bias
    en
  • Keyword(s)
    Self-deception
    en
  • Keyword(s)
    Beliefs
    en
  • Keyword(s)
    Awareness
    en
  • Dewey Decimal Classification number(s)
    150
  • Title
    Disbelieved Beliefs: Subjective Estimates of Bias in Probabilistic Beliefs And Their Relationships to Desire
    en
  • DRO type
    preprint