Disbelieved Beliefs: Subjective Estimates of Bias in Probabilistic Beliefs And Their Relationships to Desire
This article is a preprint and has not been certified by peer review [What does this mean?].
Author(s) / Creator(s)
Baron, Jonathan
Siepmann, Michael
Steinberg, Karen
Sabini, John
Abstract / Description
It has often been argued or assumed that it is impossible to simultaneously have a belief and disbelieve that belief, or view it as biased in a specific direction. In three studies we asked people what they believed were the probabilities of various outcomes varying in desirability, and then asked them what they would believe if they thought (a) in the way they would ideally like themselves and others to think, (b) in a way that would maximize the accuracy of their beliefs, or (c) in a way that would maximize the effectiveness of their beliefs for goal achievement. Results suggest that conscious disbelief of one's beliefs is neither impossible nor uncommon, that it is related to desire (though differently for different people), and that it may reflect some degree of accurate awareness of biasing effects of desire.
Keyword(s)
Desirability bias Motivated bias Self-deception Beliefs AwarenessPersistent Identifier
Date of first publication
2021-12-09
Publisher
PsychArchives
Citation
Baron, J., Siepmann, M., Steinberg, K., & Sabini, J. (2021). Disbelieved Beliefs: Subjective Estimates of Bias in Probabilistic Beliefs And Their Relationships to Desire. PsychArchives. https://doi.org/10.23668/PSYCHARCHIVES.5280
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article004jpsp.pdfAdobe PDF - 268.27KBMD5: 9a1c63ac21954eacf9c9029a0be1582cDescription: Disbelieved beliefs
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Author(s) / Creator(s)Baron, Jonathan
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Author(s) / Creator(s)Siepmann, Michael
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Author(s) / Creator(s)Steinberg, Karen
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Author(s) / Creator(s)Sabini, John
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PsychArchives acquisition timestamp2021-12-09T09:19:59Z
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Made available on2021-12-09T09:19:59Z
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Date of first publication2021-12-09
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Abstract / DescriptionIt has often been argued or assumed that it is impossible to simultaneously have a belief and disbelieve that belief, or view it as biased in a specific direction. In three studies we asked people what they believed were the probabilities of various outcomes varying in desirability, and then asked them what they would believe if they thought (a) in the way they would ideally like themselves and others to think, (b) in a way that would maximize the accuracy of their beliefs, or (c) in a way that would maximize the effectiveness of their beliefs for goal achievement. Results suggest that conscious disbelief of one's beliefs is neither impossible nor uncommon, that it is related to desire (though differently for different people), and that it may reflect some degree of accurate awareness of biasing effects of desire.en
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Publication statusother
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Review statusnotReviewed
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CitationBaron, J., Siepmann, M., Steinberg, K., & Sabini, J. (2021). Disbelieved Beliefs: Subjective Estimates of Bias in Probabilistic Beliefs And Their Relationships to Desire. PsychArchives. https://doi.org/10.23668/PSYCHARCHIVES.5280en
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Persistent Identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12034/4690
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Persistent Identifierhttps://doi.org/10.23668/psycharchives.5280
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Language of contenteng
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PublisherPsychArchives
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Keyword(s)Desirability biasen
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Keyword(s)Motivated biasen
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Keyword(s)Self-deceptionen
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Keyword(s)Beliefsen
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Keyword(s)Awarenessen
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Dewey Decimal Classification number(s)150
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TitleDisbelieved Beliefs: Subjective Estimates of Bias in Probabilistic Beliefs And Their Relationships to Desireen
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DRO typepreprint