Dataset for: Why do we punish? On retribution, deterrence, and the moderating role of punishment system

Code for: Nockur, L., Kesberg, R., Pfattheicher, S., & Keller, J. Why do we punish? On retribution, deterrence, and the moderating role of punishment system. Zeitschrift fuer Psychologie.

We investigated whether individuals’ punishment behavior aims at compensating for inflicted harm (i.e., retribution) or at deterring the offender from committing the offense again (i.e., deterrence), and whether punishment motives depend on the punishment system. Participants (N=149) assigned punishment for selfish decisions in a group resource allocation task under three conditions: Open punishment (the allocator is informed about the punishment, allowing for retribution and deterrence); hidden punishment (the allocator is not informed about the punishment, precluding deterrence); and unintentional offense (decision is made by the computer not the allocator, precluding retribution and deterrence). In line with retribution motives, participants assigned more punishment under hidden punishment compared to unintentional offense and open punishment. We found these differences in punishment between punishment conditions only under centralized punishment (i.e., punishment can only be executed by one group member), but not under decentralized punishment (i.e., each group member can punish).

We investigate whether individuals’ punishment behavior aims at compensating for inflicted harm (i.e., retribution) or at deterring the offender from committing the offense again (i.e., deterrence), and whether punishment motives depend on the punishment system. Implementing a strategy method, participants (N = 150) can assign punishment for each possible decision of an allocator in a group resource allocation task under three conditions: Open punishment (the allocator knows about the punishment, allowing for retribution and deterrence); hidden punishment (the allocator does not know about the punishment, precluding deterrence); and unintentional offense (decision is made by the computer not the allocator, precluding retribution and deterrence). Contrasting punishment in the hidden punishment and unintentional offense condition reveals retribution, whereas contrasting punishment in the open and hidden punishment condition reveals deterrence. We further examine whether punishment motives depend on whether individuals punish in a decentralized or centralized punishment system.