Reconsidering the differences between shame and guilt
Author(s) / Creator(s)
Miceli, Maria
Castelfranchi, Cristiano
Abstract / Description
Although most researchers maintain that shame and guilt are distinct emotions, the debate on their differences is still open. We aim to show that some of the current distinctions between shame and guilt need to be redrawn, and their adaptive and social implications need to be revisited. We suggest the following distinguishing criteria: the kind of self-evaluation involved (inadequacy versus harmfulness); one’s focus on the perceived discrepancy between actual and ideal self versus one’s focus on the perceived responsibility for one’s fault; and consequently the different domains of self-esteem involved. Although these criteria have been in part suggested or alluded to in the relevant literature, we use and integrate them with each other in a novel way. This allows to better distinguish between shame and guilt, as well as to account for their possible coexistence or the shift from one emotion to the other.
Keyword(s)
guilt shame self-evaluation inadequacy harmfulness moral emotions responsibility self-esteemPersistent Identifier
Date of first publication
2018-08-31
Journal title
Europe's Journal of Psychology
Volume
14
Issue
3
Page numbers
710–733
Publisher
PsychOpen GOLD
Publication status
publishedVersion
Review status
peerReviewed
Is version of
Citation
Miceli, M., & Castelfranchi, C. (2018). Reconsidering the differences between shame and guilt. Europe's Journal of Psychology, 14(3), 710–733. https://doi.org/10.5964/ejop.v14i3.1564
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ejop.v14i3.1564.pdfAdobe PDF - 284.75KBMD5: a09ddab1635d2874c08bec96b498a0c5
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Author(s) / Creator(s)Miceli, Maria
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Author(s) / Creator(s)Castelfranchi, Cristiano
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PsychArchives acquisition timestamp2018-11-21T10:00:29Z
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Made available on2018-11-21T10:00:29Z
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Date of first publication2018-08-31
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Abstract / DescriptionAlthough most researchers maintain that shame and guilt are distinct emotions, the debate on their differences is still open. We aim to show that some of the current distinctions between shame and guilt need to be redrawn, and their adaptive and social implications need to be revisited. We suggest the following distinguishing criteria: the kind of self-evaluation involved (inadequacy versus harmfulness); one’s focus on the perceived discrepancy between actual and ideal self versus one’s focus on the perceived responsibility for one’s fault; and consequently the different domains of self-esteem involved. Although these criteria have been in part suggested or alluded to in the relevant literature, we use and integrate them with each other in a novel way. This allows to better distinguish between shame and guilt, as well as to account for their possible coexistence or the shift from one emotion to the other.en_US
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Publication statuspublishedVersion
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Review statuspeerReviewed
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CitationMiceli, M., & Castelfranchi, C. (2018). Reconsidering the differences between shame and guilt. Europe's Journal of Psychology, 14(3), 710–733. https://doi.org/10.5964/ejop.v14i3.1564
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ISSN1841-0413
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Persistent Identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12034/1123
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Persistent Identifierhttps://doi.org/10.23668/psycharchives.1315
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Language of contenteng
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PublisherPsychOpen GOLD
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Is version ofhttps://doi.org/10.5964/ejop.v14i3.1564
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Keyword(s)guilten_US
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Keyword(s)shameen_US
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Keyword(s)self-evaluationen_US
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Keyword(s)inadequacyen_US
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Keyword(s)harmfulnessen_US
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Keyword(s)moral emotionsen_US
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Keyword(s)responsibilityen_US
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Keyword(s)self-esteemen_US
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Dewey Decimal Classification number(s)150
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TitleReconsidering the differences between shame and guilten_US
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DRO typearticle
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Issue3
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Journal titleEurope's Journal of Psychology
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Page numbers710–733
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Volume14
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Visible tag(s)Version of Record